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Abstract
Yes, indeed; at least for macroeconomic policy interaction. We examine a Neo-
Classical economy and provide the conditions for policy arrangements to success-
fully stabilize the economy when agents have either rational or adaptive expecta-
tions. For a contemporaneous-data monetary policy rule, the monetarist solution
is unique and stationary under a passive fiscal/active monetary policy regime if
monetary policy appropriately incorporates expectational heterogeneity. In con-
trast, the active fiscal/passive monetary policy regime’s fiscalist solution is prone
to explosiveness due to empirically plausible expectational heterogeneity. Never-
theless, this can be a well-defined, rather orthodox equilibrium. For operational
monetary policy rules, only the results for the fiscalist solution prevail. Moreover,
our results are plausible from an adaptive learning viewpoint.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modeling expectations in modern macroeconomics is dominated by the para-
digm of homogeneous expectations. Even when a continuum of agents is assumed,
routinely subjective expectations coincide with the average expectations as sym-
metry among agents is imposed. The prevalence of homogeneous expectations
reaches far beyond the dominating rational expectations hypothesis (REH) into
the literature on bounded rationality. One example is the standard adaptive
learning approach as discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
However, recent empirical and experimental research provides compelling evi-
dence undermining the homogeneous expectations hypothesis. Evidence in favor
of the heterogeneous expectations hypothesis based on survey data can be found
in Branch (2004) or Bovi (2013).1 Cornea et al. (2013) present evidence based on
aggregate time series, and Hommes (2011), Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2013), as well as
Assenza et al. (2013) document the pervasiveness of heterogeneous expectations
in laboratory experiments. Hommes (2011) reviews this literature.
These findings have triggered a notable number of studies tackling the is-
sue of how expectational heterogeneity may affect aggregate economic dynam-
ics. Examples are the seminal work of Brock and Hommes (1997) on dynamic
predictor selection, or, the contributions of Branch and Evans (2006), Branch
and McGough (2009, 2010), Berardi (2009), Kurz et al. (2013), Massaro (2013),
Gasteiger (2014), and Hommes and Lustenhouwer (2015). Nonetheless, the issue
of fiscal and monetary policy interaction, so far, has only been examined under
the homogeneous expectations hypothesis. This is somewhat surprising given the
finding that not only fiscal and monetary policy interaction, but also the expecta-
tional set-up can have important consequences for aggregate economic dynamics
1Further evidence is provided in Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al. (2003), and Branch (2007).
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in general and the determination of the price level in particular. Prominent
examples for analyses under homogeneous expectations are Leeper (1991) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2007). The core questions in this strand of the literature
are whether fiscal variables affect the price level and what policy arrangements
successfully stabilize the economy. The answer crucially depends on the policy
regime in place and private sector behavior, including its expectations.2 In fact,
depending on the particular policy regime, typically a certain unique station-
ary rational expectations equilibria (REE) is possible and stabilizes the economy.
One is routinely denoted the fiscalist solution, where price level determination
depends on fiscal variables, whereas the other one is referred to as monetarist
solution, in which the price level is independent of fiscal variables.3
Our primary contribution is to examine the determinacy properties of various
fiscal and monetary policy regimes under heterogeneous expectations.4 Thereby
we address the issue of whether fiscal variables and private sector expectations
can affect inflation, and, whether heterogeneous private sector expectations can
constitute a new challenge for policy interaction with regard to stabilization pol-
icy. The key novelty is that we embed fiscal and monetary policy interaction a` la
Leeper (1991) into a heterogeneous expectations set-up a` la Branch and McGough
(2009).5 Fiscal and monetary policy arrangements that successfully stabilize the
2Recently Cochrane (2011), Leeper and Zhou (2013), and Sims (2013) argued that fiscal
policy has a crucial role in the determination of the price level and that current fiscal and
monetary policy arrangements fail to account for this.
3Davig and Leeper (2006, 2011) empirically document the related fiscal and monetary policy
regimes in post-war US data.
4As our heterogeneous expectations model can be written as an associated rational expecta-
tions model, see Branch and McGough (2004), we can analyze RE solutions. Thus, a situation
in which there exists a unique stationary REE is referred to local determinacy. Moreover, local
indeterminacy denotes the existence of multiple stationary REE. Finally, if no stationary REE
exists, the economy is said to feature local divergence or explosiveness.
5Woodford (2013) recently forcefully illustrates the desirability of policy recommendations,
which are robust across various reasonable expectational set-ups. However, he focuses on
homogeneous expectations and abstracts from macro policy interaction.
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economy by generating determinacy are of interest. Successful arrangements un-
der heterogeneous expectations are of even higher relevance, as expectational
heterogeneity can be an important source of economic instability for the mon-
etarist solution in New-Keynesian models (see, e.g., Zhao, 2007; Branch and
McGough, 2009; Massaro, 2013). In contrast, our results are derived in a model
with an admittedly simpler production side, but we consider a much broader set
of policy regimes, while nesting the policy regimes of the aforementioned studies.
In consequence, our approach permits various new insights.
Thus, our work not only states a straightforward extension of the seminal
contribution of Leeper (1991) on policy interaction under the REH, and the com-
plementary analysis by Branch et al. (2008). It also contributes to a burgeoning
strand of the literature, which considers macroeconomic policy interaction under
different expectational set-ups and its implications for stabilization policy. In
particular, see Evans and Honkapohja (2005, 2007) or Eusepi and Preston (2012)
under homogeneous adaptive learning.6 Our analysis extends this literature by
putting forth a theory of fiscal and monetary policy interaction under heteroge-
neous rather than homogeneous expectations. This generates new restrictions on
policy interaction, which are relevant for the design of stabilization policies.
In particular, we assume that agents either have rational (RE) or adaptive
expectations (AE). One can interpret such a set-up as one of persistent hetero-
geneity. Evans and Honkapohja (2013) argue that this is a plausible assumption,
even when agents may entertain various forecasting models.7
6The mentioned studies examine Leeper (1991)-type policy interaction in a system linearised
around a deterministic steady-state. For global analyses of policy interaction we refer the reader
to Evans et al. (2008) or Benhabib et al. (2014).
7Others have considered persistently heterogeneous expectations before. For instance
Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) investigate monetary policy under coexistence of two types of
forecasts arising from two different adaptive learning rules. Berardi’s (2009) set-up implies
3
Despite the fact that such a modeling approach partly neglects the plurality
of predictors that the afore-mentioned evidence suggests, it is appealing for at
least three reasons. First, a common feature of the evidence is the presence of a
relatively large share of agents with AE among agents with access to various pre-
dictors. Branch (2004, p.617) finds a share of agents with AE around 47%.8 Also
Bovi (2013) finds favorable evidence for persistent heterogeneity in expectations.
Furthermore, the evidence discussed in Massaro (2013, p.687) suggests that a
share of backward-looking agents in the range of 20% to 60% seems plausible.
Second, this approach allows for analytical tractability, and third, the model nests
the RE benchmark case. The latter, and limiting the analysis to a Neo-Classical
economy, facilitates a direct comparison to the related literature on fiscal and
monetary policy interaction (i.e., Leeper, 1991; Evans and Honkapohja, 2007).9
Assuming expectational heterogeneity in this way, introduces lagged inflation
as a new state variable to the economy. This eventually changes the dynamic
properties of the economy and the resulting policy implications. Actually, we
show that different restrictions on RE solutions can emerge when we focus on the
determinate cases. One involves inflation depending on fiscal variables, i.e., the
fiscalist solution, whereas others do not, i.e., monetarist solutions.
Subsequently we examine the full set of REE and find that four different
types of stationary solutions are possible. We relate the four types of solutions
to different policy regimes and show under which conditions the shares of agents
with RE and AE have a crucial role in determining economic outcomes. A key
persistent heterogeneity asymptotically. Branch and McGough (2009), Branch and McGough
(2011), or Gasteiger (2014) simply assume persistent heterogeneity.
8This also includes the special case of na¨ıve expectations. Branch (2004) also shows that
these shares vary over time with different volatility regimes.
9Our analysis is extendable to a New-Keynesian model. This is the goal in a related paper.
Eusepi and Preston (2012) provide a suitable framework under homogeneous expectations.
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result is that whether or not the fiscalist solution is stationary, turns out to
depend crucially on the share of agents with RE. Surprisingly, even in the non-
stationary case, as long as monetary policy is passive, the equilibrium may be
well-defined and exhibit ‘orthodox’ properties (see, McCallum, 2003, p.1172).
In contrast, non-explosiveness of the monetarist solution appears to be less
vulnerable to the presence of heterogeneous expectations under a contemporaneous-
data rule. This can be explained by the extent to which monetary policy incor-
porates heterogeneous private sector expectations. In fact, obeying a general-
ized version of the Taylor (1993)-principle that guarantees that, in response to a
change in inflation, the real interest rate always moves more in the same direction
than inflation itself, generates determinacy. In this sense, active monetary policy
is no longer unconstrained, but constrained by expectational heterogeneity.
Following Branch et al. (2008), we assess the generality of our findings, by con-
sidering operational interest rate rules instead of Leeper’s (1991) contemporaneous-
data rule. It turns out, that our finding for the fiscalist solution is robust with
regard to these alternative specifications of monetary policy, whereas the mon-
etarist solution is no longer determinate under operational rules. This is a re-
markable result, as most of the monetary literature builds on solutions of this
type and develops predictions conditional on this solution being determinate.10
Finally, following Evans and Honkapohja (2007), we assess the plausibility
of our findings from an adaptive learning viewpoint by replacing agents with
RE by agents who behave like econometricians. They estimate the structural
parameters by a least-squares (LS) regression model, base their forecasts on this
model, and, repeat estimation as well as forecast updating whenever new data
becomes available. A REE is plausible, when it is locally stable under such LS
10Kirsanova et al. (2009) denote this the ‘current consensus assignment’.
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learning, and it turns out that all our findings are indeed plausible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present a simple Neo-
Classical economy under heterogeneous expectations and the derivation of the
aggregate equilibrium conditions from individual behavior in Section 2. Section
3 analyzes the dynamic properties of the model, presents our main results and
discusses their policy implications. In Section 4 we present results for alternative
monetary policy specifications and an assessment of the plausibility of our results
from an adaptive learning viewpoint. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We develop our analysis in a heterogeneous expectations version of the model
outlined in Evans and Honkapohja (2007). We consider infinitely many house-
holds and each individual household i of type ς has a utility function, which
depends on real consumption in period s, cςs(i), beginning of period real money
balances, pi−1s m
ς
s−1(i), where m
ς
s(i) = M
ς
s (i)/Ps, M
ς
s (i) denotes nominal money
balances, and Ps is the aggregate price level. Thus, pis = Ps/Ps−1 is the gross
inflation rate. The household’s maximization problem is given by
max Eςt

∞∑
s=t
βs−t
cςs(i)(1−σ1)
(1− σ1) +A
(
mςs−1(i)
pis
)(1−σ2)
(1− σ2)

 (1)
s.t. cςs(i) +m
ς
s(i) + b
ς
s(i) + τs = y +
mςs−1(i)
pis
+Rs−1
bςs−1(i)
pis
, (2)
where (2) is the household’s budget constraint. Moreover, 0 < β < 1 is the
discount factor, σ1 > 0 and σ2 > 0 are the elasticities of substitution, and
A is a relative weight on real balances. y > 0 is a constant endowment and
bςs(i) = B
ς
s(i)/Ps are end-of-period holdings of bonds in real terms, where B
ς
s(i) is
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the nominal end of period nominal government bond holdings. Next, τs are real
lump-sum taxes, and Rs−1 is the pre-determined gross nominal interest rate paid
at the beginning of period s. Finally, the government is assumed to purchase and
waste constant g ≥ 0 in each period.11
The subjective expectations operator of a household of type ς is denoted
Eςt {·}. We assume that all households are perfectly identical apart from the way
they form expectations. In this regard, a household is considered to be of one
of the two types ς ∈ {1, 2}. Following the heterogeneous expectations set-up of
Branch and McGough (2009), for any variable qt we have
E1t qt+1 = Etqt+1, (3)
E2t qt+1 = ιE
2
t qt = ι
2qt−1, and (4)
Êtqt+1 = χEtqt+1 + (1− χ)ι2qt−1. (5)
Here χ is the share of agents of type ς = 1 forming RE as in (3). Agents of
type ς = 2 form AE for unobserved and next period variables, and ι is the
coefficient that these agents use to forecast variables based on the most recent
observation according to (4). Aggregate expectations are given by (5). We restrict
the coefficient to ι > 0 and consider χ ∈ (0, 1].12
Appendix A shows that optimal behavior of households and market clearing
conditions yield the aggregate Fisher relation and a money market equilibrium
11As there is no idiosyncratic income risk, we deny agents to trade state-contingent claims.
12See Branch and McGough (2009, p.1038) for more details on the subjective expectations
operator. Agents of type ς = 1 can be thought of ‘really good forecasters’.
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condition in period t, expressed in deviations from steady-state, i.e.,
R˜−1t = βÊt{p˜i−1t+1}, and (6)
m˜t = C˜Êt{p˜it+1}, (7)
where transversality condition limt→∞ βtEςt c
ς
t(i)
−σ1(bςt(i) +m
ς
t(i)) = 0 holds.
13
Next, the government budget constraint in real terms is given by
bt +mt + τt = g +
mt−1
pit
+Rt−1
bt−1
pit
. (8)
It basically states that government spending and interest payments on debt out-
standing can be funded by issuing new debt, seigniorage, and taxes.
Following Leeper (1991), we assume two independent public authorities that
interact with each other. First, there is a fiscal authority with tax rule
τt = γ0 + γbt−1 + ψt. (9)
The rule implies that the authority responds to previous period real debt. ψt
is the exogenous fiscal policy shock. Second, there is a central bank conducting
monetary policy according to the contemporaneous-data interest rate rule
Rt = α0 + αpit + θt. (10)
Thus, this rule relates the central bank’s policy instrument to its mandate of
controlling inflation and captures monetary policy shocks, θt. Here θt and ψt are
assumed to be exogenous iid mean zero random shocks. The feedback of policy
13q˜t represents the respective variable in deviation from steady-state, i.e., q˜t ≡ (qt − q).
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to the targeted variable is governed by the coefficients γ and α. These coefficients
determine qualitatively different types of fiscal and monetary policies (see Leeper,
1991; Evans and Honkapohja, 2007).
DEFINITION 1. If |β−1 − γ| > 1, the fiscal authority’s policy is active(AF).
In contrast, if |β−1 − γ| < 1, fiscal policy is considered to be passive (PF). The
central bank’s policy is active (AM) if |αβ| > 1 and passive (PM) if |αβ| < 1.
This definition is based on the roots of the economic system considered, i.e.,
αβ and β−1 − γ. As policy parameters α and γ enter these roots, the above
definition divides the policy parameter space into regions where either none, one,
or, both roots are (un-)stable. Therefore the dynamic properties of the system
are fundamentally different in each region. The aforementioned authors explain
that, for the empirically realistic case, 0 ≤ γ < β−1, AF implies that under rule
(9) the additional tax revenue generated from a small increase in the steady-state
level of debt is lower than the increase in the related interest payments. For PF,
the reverse is true. Moreover, α > β−1 implies a positive response of the real
interest rate to an increase in steady-state inflation. Notice that this condition
is often referred to as the Taylor (1993)-principle.14
According to Leeper (1991), in economic terms, it follows that a passive policy
of either the central bank or the fiscal authority is constraint by private sector
behavior, including its expectations, and the active policy of the other authority.
The passive policy aims at balancing the inter-temporal budget constraint, either
by means of generating inflation or sufficient tax revenue.
14For instance, in the New-Keynesian benchmark model under the REH with rule (10), the
principle is α > 1.
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3. DYNAMIC PROPERTIES UNDER POLICY INTERACTION
3.1. Main Results
The linearized economy (6)-(7), including the policy block (8) to (10) as well
as the expectational set-up (3) to (5), can be expressed by a two-dimensional
system (as in Evans and Honkapohja, 2007)
p˜it = (αβ)
−1χEtp˜it+1 + (αβ)−1(1− χ)ι2p˜it−1 − α−1θt (11)
0 = b˜t+1 + ϕ1χEtp˜it+1 + ϕ1(1− χ)ι2p˜it−1 + ϕ2p˜it
− (β−1 − γ)b˜t + ψt+1 + ϕ3θt+1 + ϕ4θt, where (12)
ϕ1 = [C˜βα +mpi
−2 +Rbpi−2], ϕ2 = [−pi−1C˜βα− pi−1bα],
ϕ3 = C˜β, ϕ4 = [−pi−1C˜β − pi−1b].
Following their example, we abstract from the special cases α = 0, αβ = 1,
γβ = 1, and β−1 − γ = 1. Hereby we rule out the peculiar case of eigenvalues on
the unit circle as well as a scenario of no policy feedback, or, a scenario where
the government exactly pays all debt (including interest) off.
In Appendix B we define yt ≡ [p˜it, b˜t, p˜it−1]′ and show that λ1 ≡ (β−1 − γ)−1,
λ2 ≡ (αβ)−
√
(αβ)2−4Θχ
2Θ
, and λ3 ≡ (αβ)+
√
(αβ)2−4Θχ
2Θ
, Θ ≡ (1 − χ)ι2, are the eigen-
values of our economic system. The crucial difference between the economy in
Evans and Honkapohja (2007) and the one herein is, that the latter involves the
dynamics of one free and two predetermined variables in presence of heteroge-
neous expectations, i.e., χ < 1. The additional state variable is p˜it−1. This has
important consequences for the question of when a REE is locally determinate.
Technically speaking, local determinacy requires that the number of eigenval-
ues inside (outside) the unit circle matches the number of free (predetermined)
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variables, which is one (two) in our case. If the number of eigenvalues inside the
unit circle exceeds (is below) the number of free variables, then the economy is
said to be locally explosive (indeterminate).15
Now we pursue one of our main goals, which is to relate qualitatively different
economic dynamics to certain policy regimes. First, note that λ1 is similar to the
root related to fiscal policy in Definition 1 above. Furthermore, it is obvious that
|λ1| > 1 if |(β−1−γ)| < 1 is the case. This corresponds to PF under homogeneous
expectations and the reverse is true in case of AF. Second, inspection of λ2 and
λ3 suggests to refine the notion of AM and PM as follows.
DEFINITION 2. Monetary policy is passive under heterogeneous expectations
(PMHE) if (αβ) < (χ+ Θ). Moreover, monetary policy is active under heteroge-
neous expectations (AMHE) if (αβ) > (χ+ Θ).
This is a straightforward modification. In case of AMHE, we will find |λ2| < 1
and |λ3| > 1 and with PMHE it turns out that both |λ2| and |λ3| are either inside
or outside the unit circle. Thus, the modification allows us to divide the policy
parameter space in a way similar to Leeper (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2007). Likewise, as PMHE (AMHE) corresponds to PM (AM) for χ = 1, the
definition nests the natural RE benchmark case. Finally, as we argue below, the
definition of AMHE can be regarded as a generalized Taylor (1993)-principle,
α > β−1(χ + Θ). Thus, a central bank that aims at satisfying this generalized
principle, will have to explicitly incorporate private sector expectations into its
policy decisions.16 In the subsequent analysis, this turns out to be one of the
main challenges for policy interaction constituted by heterogeneous expectations.
15Branch and McGough (2004) have shown that one can examine the determinacy properties
of the economy herein by utilizing the standard techniques as outlined in Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) or Klein (2000). Corresponding to their approach, (11)-(12) states the associated RE
model and solutions to this model are also solutions to the heterogeneous expectations economy.
16For ι = 1 the principle collapses to its homogeneous expectations counterpart α > β−1.
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For the moment, let us focus on the stationary cases. In Appendix B, we
argue that linear restrictions of the type
p˜it = K1b˜t +K2θt +K3p˜it−1 (13)
emerge and yield a stationary solution. In particular we find that:
(i) In the case of AF/PMHE, |λ1| < 1, and |λ2|, |λ3| > 1;
(ii) In the case of PF/AMHE, |λ1| > 1, |λ2| < 1, and |λ3| > 1 with K1 = 0;
(iii) In the case of PF/PMHE, |λ1|, |λ2| > 1 and |λ3| < 1 with K1 = 0.
In the homogeneous RE version of this economy a PF/PM regime leads to inde-
terminacy and an AF/AM regime yields local divergence. Thus, we ask to what
extent these findings carry over to the heterogeneous expectations version.
In order to do so, we examine the whole set of REE. We define vt ≡ [θt, ψt]′
and recast the economy (11)-(12) as
yt = MEtyt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pvt + Rvt−1, where (14)
M =

(αβ)−1χ 0 0
−ϕ1(αβ)−1χ 0 0
0 0 0
 , N =

(αβ)−1Θ 0 0
−ϕ1(αβ)−1Θ− ϕ2 β−1 − γ 0
1 0 0
 ,
P =

−α−1 0
ϕ1α
−1 − ϕ3 −1
0 0
 , and R =

0 0
−ϕ4 0
0 0
 . (15)
We assume that REE follow
yt = A + Byt−1 + Cvt + Dvt−1. (16)
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In consequence, the very same undetermined coefficient reasoning as in Evans
and Honkapohja (2007, p.678) leads to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. One can verify that there exist four types of solutions:
(I) One solution is characterized by satisfying restriction (i) and matrix B =
(κχ)−1×

−βΘϕ1 −
(
αβ2 + (βγ − 1)χ)ϕ2 −β−1 [(α(βγ − 1) + Θ)β2 + (βγ − 1)2χ] 0
β
(
Θϕ21 + αβϕ2ϕ1 + χϕ
2
2
)
β(α(βγ − 1) + Θ)ϕ1 + (βγ − 1)χϕ2 0
1 0 0
 ,
where κ ≡ (βγ−1)ϕ1−βϕ2. A = 0, and C as well as D are also uniquely
determined. In this case, the eigenvalues of matrix B are {0, χ−1Θλ2, χ−1Θ
λ3}. We denote this the fiscalist solution under heterogeneous expectations.
In case of χ = 1 this solution corresponds to the traditional fiscalist solution.
(II) A second solution satisfies restriction (ii) with matrices B =
χ−1Θλ3 0 0
−χ−1Θλ3ϕ1 − ϕ2 λ−11 0
1 0 0
, and A = 0. Moreover, C and D are
uniquely determined. The eigenvalues of matrix B are
{
0, λ−11 , χ
−1 Θλ3}.
This can be denoted the monetarist solution under heterogeneous expecta-
tions. For χ = 1 this solution is the traditional monetarist solution.
(III) A third solution, satisfying restriction (iii), is possible and is character-
ized by matrices B =

χ−1Θλ2 0 0
−χ−1Θλ2ϕ1 − ϕ2 λ−11 0
1 0 0
, A = 0, C and D
uniquely determined. The eigenvalues of matrix B are
{
0, λ−11 , χ
−1Θλ2
}
.
Again, this solution states nothing but the monetarist solution.
(IV) Finally, there is a continuum of non-fundamental solutions characterized
13
by matrices B =

χ−1(αβ) 0 −χ−1Θ
−χ−1(αβ)ϕ1 − ϕ2 χ−1Θϕ1 0
1 0 0
, and A = 0.
However there exist multiple solutions for C and D.
Note that (IV) describes a situation, where there exist multiple stationary
solution paths for inflation, indexed by their initial values or eventually sunspots
for a given level of the nominal money supply. This in turn engenders multiple
paths for real balance growth, see Leeper (1991).
Next, we restrict attention to the parameter space α > 0, γ ≥ 0, and β−1 >
γ ≥ 0. As argued above, the literature regards this as the empirical realistic case
and for this case we derive our main results. As we prove in Appendix C, we can
relate the solutions to certain policy regimes, which is our main goal.
PROPOSITION 2. Assume the monetary policy rule (10). For the empirically
realistic case it holds that:
(I) In a PF/ AMHE regime determinacy prevails.
(II) A PF/PMHE regime results in local indeterminacy or divergence, depending
on the share of agents with RE.
(III) An AF/AMHE regime yields local divergence.
(IV) Moreover, an AF/PMHE regime may lead to determinacy, if the share of
agents with RE in the economy is sufficiently high. If this share is too low,
the regime triggers local divergence.
Proposition 2 is our main result and has important policy implications. There-
fore the remainder of this section illustrates our findings graphically, provides an
intuitive explanation and discusses the implications in detail.
14
In Panels 1a and 1c below we numerically illustrate our findings of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 in the α-γ-χ-space, i.e., the coefficients from the interest rate rule,
the tax rule, and the share of agents forming RE respectively. The remaining
panels in Figure 1 are illustrations in the α-γ-space.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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(j) (k) (l)
Figure 1: Regions of local determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (dark grey), and explosive-
ness (remainder) in the empirical relevant space, i.e., α ≥ 0, 0 ≤ γ < β−1 for β = 0.99. M (F)
is the monetarist (fiscalist) solution.
In Panels 1a to 1c the value χ = 1 represents an illustration of the results
obtained by Evans and Honkapohja (2007) for the homogeneous RE benchmark
case. The additional implications of heterogeneous expectations for the dynam-
ics of the economy become evident, once we consider the cases of χ < 1. In
particular, the region of approximately α ∈ [0, β−1] and below χ ≈ 0.5. In this
area of the parameter space the PF/PMHE regime, and more important, the
AF/PMHE regime have fundamentally different dynamic properties as is known
from homogeneous expectations benchmark, i.e., local explosiveness.17
Consider Panel 1a. Some intuition can be developed for the local explosiveness
result by entertaining a scenario, where an unanticipated contractionary mone-
tary policy shock hits the economy in steady-state. Given χ = 1, and PMHE,
the shock contemporaneously raises Rt. This triggers a substitution effect : agents
substitute nominal money balances for nominal bond holdings, which means an
expansion in nominal debt. However, the inter-temporal government budget con-
straint needs to be satisfied, i.e., current real government debt outstanding must
17Technically local divergence occurs, because a policy regime fails to ensure that 0 <
|K1|, |K2|, |K3| < 1 in (13). Consequently, one or more of the coefficients are larger than
one in modulus and the dynamics of pit become explosive.
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be backed by the future discounted sum of primary government surpluses and
seigniorage. Given AF, this can only happen by a jump in Pt that lowers current
real government debt outstanding, and in turn increases pit. The more passive
fiscal policy, the weaker this effect. In the subsequent periods, due to PMHE, the
substitution effect dies out and variables return to their steady-state.
Expectational heterogeneity, χ < 1, opens a self-fulfilling channel, which is
active in the periods following the shock. It’s interplay with the substitution effect
can explain the local explosiveness. Specifically, the self-referential nature of the
model will induce an upward revision of inflation expectations of agents with AE
and yield to a further increase of pit. Given the contemporaneous-data rule, Rt
will again be raised. When the self-fulfilling channel quantitatively outweighs the
dampening nature of the PMHE stance, the raise in Rt re-enforces the interplay of
the two effects and triggers an explosive path of pit. The quantitative importance
of the self-fulfilling channel looms larger with decreasing χ, and thereby poses a
restriction on policy interaction.
Variation of ι within the rather wide range18 ι ∈ {0.9, 1.0, 1.1} in Figure 1
reveals further insights regarding the interplay between χ and ι. Consider the
determinate cases in Panels 1d to 1l. One can observe that for ι < 1, the de-
terminate region in the α-γ-space of the monetarist (fiscalist) solution increases
(decreases) with decreasing χ within the considered parameter space. The oppo-
site is true for ι > 1 and the regions remain constant for ι = 1. This behavior
of the determinacy regions is directly related to the definition of AMHE and
PMHE from above and how χ and ι restrict α regarding the monetary policy
stance. However, notice that, as long as agents with non-rational expectations
18Notice that the range of ι ∈ [0.9, 1.1] is rather large. If type ς = 2 agents observe a 1%
deviation of inflation in t − 1, their forecast for the period t + 1 deviation is in the range of
[0.81%, 1.21%].
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have forecasts that are a function of past data, their share is more decisive for the
possibility of a determinate outcome, not their particular functional form, e.g.,
whether agents with AE discount (ι < 1) or extrapolate (ι > 1) past observations.
For example, for χ = 0.4 the fiscalist solution is explosive for any ι.
3.2. Further Discussion
Our main results for rule (17) are summarized in the second column of Table
1. Contrasting them with the RE benchmark (first column of Table 1) reveals
various economic implications. First and foremost, the PF/AMHE regime yields
local determinacy under a contemporaneous-data rule. However, heterogeneous
expectations impose an informational challenge on the central bank. Recall from
Definition 2 that AMHE requires (αβ) > (χ + Θ). Therefore the central bank
needs to respond sufficiently strong to inflation, which entails to successfully
track private sector expectations, i.e., parameters χ and ι. In the logic of Leeper
(1991), it turns out that not only PF is constrained by AMHE and private sector
behavior, but for χ < 1 also the central bank is constrained by private sector
expectations. However, the challenge of tracking private sector expectations can
eventually be met by modern central banks.19
Also notice that for the homogeneous RE benchmark case AMHE means
nothing but α > β−1. This is equivalent to AM and known as the Taylor (1993)-
principle. It is fair to say, that the core of this prescription, i.e., more than
one-for-one response of the nominal interest rate to deviations in inflation, is
to affect the real interest rate. In particular, in response to positive (negative)
inflation deviations, the real interest rate should increase (decrease) in order to
lower (stimulate) aggregate demand, see, for instance, Orphanides and Williams
19In fact, central banks try to track expectations, e.g., the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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Table 1. Overview on Results
Monetary Policy
Rule and Regime Solution Expectational Set-Up
E1t = Et E
1
t = E
∗
t
χ = 1 χ < 1 χ = 1 χ < 1
(10) Leeper (1991) This Paper Evans and Honkapohja (2007) This Paper
PF/AMHE Ma Db D E-stable E-stable
PF/PMHE ∞ I I or E not E-stable not E-stable
AF/PMHE F D D or E E-stable E-stable
AF/AMHE F or M E E E-stable E-stable
(17) Branch et al. (2008) This Paper This Paper
PF/AMHE ∞ E E E-stable
PF/PMHE ∞ I I or E E-stable
AF/PMHE F D D or E E-stable
AF/AMHE F E E E-stable
(18) Branch et al. (2008) This Paper This Paper
PF/AMHE ∞ I I or E E-stable
PF/PMHE ∞ I I or E E-stable
AF/PMHE F D D or E E-stable
AF/AMHE F D D or E E-stable
a M = monetarist, F = fiscalist, or, ∞ = continuum of non-fundamental solutions.
b D = determinate, I = indeterminate, or, E = explosive.
(2005b, p.499) or Taylor (1999). In this light, even when α > β−1(χ+ Θ) implies
1 > α > β−1(χ+ Θ), policy is compliant with the Taylor (1993)-principle in the
way that the nominal interest rate setting affects the real interest rate. Or, one
can simply view α > β−1(χ+ Θ) as a generalized version of the principle, which
has to hold in a world of heterogeneous expectations.20
The view that under deviations from REH an AM may imply a response
different from the original Taylor (1993)-principle appears consistent with existing
numerical results in the literature on monetary policy rules in heterogeneous
expectations set-ups. For instance, Anufriev et al. (2013) conduct a non-linear
20A similar argument can be made for the New-Keynesian model in Branch and McGough
(2009). In their model, the condition, for the nominal interest setting to affect the real interest
in the desired way, is αpi + λ
−1[1 − β(χ + Θ)]αy > 1. αpi and αy are the coefficients of the
monetary policy rule for inflation and output gap, and, λ is the sensitivity of inflation to changes
in the output gap in the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve.
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analysis in a model that is very similar to ours. The key differences are that they
assume PF and dynamic predictor selection. They find that obeying α > β−1 is
desirable as inflation is successfully stabilized, but does not guarantee convergence
to the monetarist solution under the REH. Likewise, in linearized New-Keynesian
models, e.g., Branch and McGough (2009) or Massaro (2013), α > 1, may not
generate determinate outcomes. Under the assumption of social learning with
similar simple monetary policy rules Arifovic et al. (2013) find that the classic
Taylor (1993)-principle, α > 1, is not necessary for the convergence. Moreover,
the simulations of De Grauwe (2010) suggest that given α > 1, the larger α,
the more successful is stabilization policy. Under homogeneous adaptive learning
under optimal policy (see Orphanides and Williams, 2005a,b, 2007a,b) similar
findings occur. These authors also find that responding to inflation expectations
rather than realized inflation improves stabilization policy as well.
Second, our result for the AF/PMHE regime deserves special attention. Based
on the homogeneous RE benchmark case, on may argue that, once fiscal policy
switches from PF to AF, the central bank can bring about determinacy by switch-
ing from AM to PM. This argument acknowledges the fact that it is usually the
central bank that is more flexible and faster in implementing policy changes.
However, an AF/PMHE regime makes the economy prone to local divergence,
if roughly the majority of agents has AE. This is in the empirical range that is
documented by Branch (2004) or discussed in Massaro (2013), i.e., χ ∈ [0.4, 0.8].
Thus, one can view this finding as a challenge to policy interaction. The policy
rules considered do not allow for successfully stabilization policy for certain χ.
Eventually, fiscal rules that account for private sector expectations may be able to
safeguard the economy against explosive dynamics in inflation in this situation.
Be also aware that the divergence induced by agents with AE may be a well-
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defined equilibrium. In fact, Pt, Mt, and Bt diverge, but the transversality con-
ditions may be satisfied along these paths. Thus, the non-stationary fiscalist
solution herein is different from the one found by McCallum (2001, p.20ff.) un-
der the REH and AM (i.e., constant money supply). In our case, the price level
and nominal money balances, and, necessarily also pit and ∆Mt
21, move together.
McCallum (2003, p.1172) notices this ‘orthodox’ property of the fiscalist solution
in the stationary case under homogeneous expectations, i.e., AF/PMHE with
χ = 1. Furthermore, Woodford (2003, p.1184) regards this policy arrangement
as the ‘primary case’ that one should consider.
Third, the PF/PMHE, in theory, may be a more unpleasant regime than is
known under homogeneous RE. In this case both the fiscalist and the monetarist
solution, as part of the continuum of possible solutions, are stationary for the
benchmark case χ = 1. However, when the share of agents with AE becomes
sufficiently high, this regime leads to divergence for the whole continuum of so-
lutions. In fact, the dynamics of pit and bt become complex under this regime.
However it is worthwhile that the non-stationary fiscalist solution again may have
a rather orthodox behavior.
Fourth, our analysis confirms the finding of the homogeneous expectations
literature on policy interaction that an AF/AMHE regime leads to local explo-
siveness. Thus, the expectational set-up does not affect the simple logic that the
economy diverges if authorities ignore government solvency requirements.
Finally, Branch and McGough (2009) demonstrate in the very same expecta-
tional set-up as ours with a forward-looking interest rate rule that it is rather the
weight on past data (discounting vs. extrapolating past data) than the share of
agents with AE, which is crucial in engendering determinacy. In the presence of
21This can be verified in an analysis similar to McCallum and Nelson (2005).
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purely AE, monetary policy can again implement the monetarist solution with
more moderate feedback to inflation relative to the RE benchmark. In contrast, if
AE are extrapolative, the opposite is true. Our results for the contemporaneous-
data rule (10) are only to some extent consistent with the ones of Branch and
McGough (2009). For the monetarist solution, we can confirm their finding.
However, in case of the fiscalist solution, the effect of the weight of past data
influences the size of the determinacy region exactly in the opposite direction.
Moreover, the magnitude of ι is of secondary importance when χ is too small, as
the fiscalist solution then becomes explosive for any ι > 0.22
4. ROBUSTNESS
4.1. Implementability Concerns
Starting with McCallum (1999), many authors have questioned whether a
rule like (10) may be operational or implementable. The key issue is that current
period observations of aggregate variables are hardly available to policy makers.
Subsequently Branch et al. (2008) argue that the well-known implementability
concerns regarding rule (10) have to be addressed in the context of policy inter-
action by considering a backward-looking or a forward-looking rule, i.e.,
Rt = α0 + αpit−1 + θt, or (17)
Rt = α0 + αÊtpit+1 + θt.
23 (18)
22A related question to the above analysis is how a transitory monetary or fiscal policy shock
propagates through this economy. This analysis can be found in an online appendix, which is
available on the author’s website: www.urleiwand.com. In short, we find persistent responses to
transitory shocks, and, depending on the policy regime, dampening oscillations. These results
are solely driven by expectational heterogeneity.
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As we prove in Appendix D, our results for rule (17) are the following.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume the monetary policy rule (17). For the empirically
realistic case it holds that:
(I) In a PF/ AMHE regime there is local divergence.
(II) A PF/PMHE regime results in local indeterminacy or divergence. The latter
is true, if PMHE is overly passive, which depends on the share of agents
with RE and monetary policy feedback α.
(III) An AF/AMHE regime yields local divergence.
(IV) An AF/PMHE regime may lead to determinacy, if PMHE is not too passive.
Again, this depends on the share of agents with RE and monetary policy
feedback α. If PMHE is overly passive, the regime triggers local divergence.
The panels in Figure 2 below provide a numerical exposition of our results
in Propositions 3 in the α-γ-χ-space. Again, χ = 1 is the RE benchmark (as in
Branch et al., 2008). We observe that only PM can lead to stationary solutions
and AF is a necessary condition for determinacy. In consequence, only the fiscalist
solution can be determinate. Branch et al. (2008, p.1099)’s intuition for this result
stems on the substitution effect described above: under a backward-looking rule,
an unanticipated contractionary monetary policy shock unambiguously raises Rt,
which induces substitution of nominal money balances for nominal bonds, which,
as discussed above, creates inflation. In the subsequent period, as Rt responds
actively to pit−1, it fails to offset the shock, but reinforces the substitution effect
and local divergence occurs.
23Interest rate rule (18) is a straightforward adaption of the rule Rt = α0 + αEtpit+1 + θt
considered in Branch et al. (2008). The intention is to analyse a rule that is assumed to feed
back to aggregate private sector expectations.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
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(j) (k) (l)
Figure 2: Regions of local determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (dark grey), and explosive-
ness (remainder) for backward-looking monetary policy in the empirical relevant α-γ-χ-space,
i.e., α ≥ 0, 0 ≤ γ < β−1, β = 0.99.
However, considering heterogeneous expectations provides additional insights.
On the one side, these results partially extend the findings of Branch et al. (2008)
for the AMHE stance to the case of heterogeneous expectations. On the other
side, below χ ≈ 0.5 our results also give new insights regarding the PMHE stance.
As one can see from Panels 2j to 2l, if policy is overly passive, i.e., low values
of α, then such a policy triggers local divergence in both the AF/PMHE and
the PM/PMHE regime. The intuitive explanation is again the interplay of the
substitution effect and the self-fulfilling channel, as described above. In this
sense, expectational heterogeneity restricts the central bank further constituting
an additional challenge. A central bank aiming at a determinate outcome faces
an upper and lower bound on α. Neither can policy be active, nor overly passive.
Finally, the effect of a variation of ι is similar to our observations from above.
Next, we demonstrate in Appendix E the following results for rule (18).
PROPOSITION 4. Assume the monetary policy rule (18). For the empirically
realistic case it holds that exclusively under AF determinacy may prevail. The
latter depends on the share of agents with RE.
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Figure 3 illustrates our results in Proposition 4 in the α-γ-χ-space. The RE
benchmark (χ = 1) confirms the findings of Branch et al. (2008). For this rule,
there is no constraint on monetary policy. Nevertheless, once the χ decreases
approximately below 0.5, the self-fulfilling channel again triggers local divergence.
The results above show that AF is a necessary condition for determinacy in
the empirically realistic case for both, the backward- or forward-looking interest
rate rule. However, in the latter case a sufficiently large share of agents with RE is
necessary as well. For both rules, if policy interaction obtains a unique stationary
REE, it is the fiscalist solution. A new challenge to policy interaction under the
backward-looking rule, which emerges from heterogeneous expectations, is that
monetary policy cannot be overly passive. So policy interaction needs to be
designed more carefully in this case.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
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(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 3: Regions of local determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (dark grey), and explosive-
ness (remainder) for forward-looking monetary policy in the empirical relevant α-γ-χ-space,
i.e., α ≥ 0, 0 ≤ γ < β−1, β = 0.99.
The finding regarding the backward-looking rule that monetary policy must
be passive to achieve determinacy confirms the result of Branch et al. (2008)
and contrasts the one of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). Note that the latter
study considers a production economy with physical capital and sticky prices.
Especially nominal rigidities appear to have a crucial impact on the findings in
the literature. For instance, compare our findings for the PF/AMHE regime
to the ones of Bullard and Mitra (2002). They also examine the determinacy
properties of rules (10), (17), and (18) in the New-Keynesian model under the
REH for sort of a PF/AMHE regime, and in each case determinacy prevails.
Another interesting result states the fact that monetary policy plays no role
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in bringing about determinacy under the forward-looking rule, which extends
the RE benchmark result of Branch et al. (2008) to the case of heterogeneous
expectations. This result is also in line with Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
For AE with θ < 1, our findings can also be related to Zhao (2007). The main
finding therein is that under an interest rate rule with feedback to expected
inflation, the monetarist solution can be implemented with weaker responses to
inflation compared to the homogeneous RE benchmark. This is consistent with
our finding for the contemporaneous-data rule, but contradicts our finding for
the forward-looking rule, where AMHE causes local divergence. However, direct
comparison is infeasible, as Zhao (2007) focuses on optimal feedback to pit and
does not provide conditions, under which policy fails to stabilize the economy.
In sum, one possible view on our results is that for a sufficiently large share
of agents with RE, and AF/PMHE regime yields determinacy, independent of
whether monetary policy is specified by a contemporaneous-data, backward- or
forward-looking interest rate rule. Moreover, in the non-stationary case, the
fiscalist solution may state a well-defined equilibrium with orthodox properties,
as the divergence is triggered by expectational heterogeneity.
4.2. Plausibility from the Adaptive Learning Viewpoint
Evans and Honkapohja’s (2007) analysis also addresses the concern of whether
Leeper’s (1991) findings regarding the monetarist and fiscalist solution under the
REH are plausible from the adaptive learning viewpoint. Thus, it appears logical
to assess our findings along the lines of Evans and Honkapohja (2007) and to
consider the issue of stability of a solution under LS learning. Therefore, in this
subsection, we assume that type ς = 1 agents act like econometricians. The sub-
jective period t forecast of any variable qt is denoted E
∗
t qt+1. For given subjective
expectations, this behavior generates a sequence of temporary equilibria.
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All derivations in Appendix A remain valid under this assumption and for all
three interest rate rules the economy can then be expressed as
yt = ME
∗
t yt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pvt + Rvt−1, (19)
and the agents consider (16) to be their perceive law of motion (PLM). As nota-
tion and analysis exactly follow Evans and Honkapohja (2007, p.679ff.) we will
refrain from laying out the details, but instead state and discuss our results for
the interest rate rules, (10), (17), and (18) in turn.
Contemporaneous-data rule. Recast the economy (11)-(12) to fit (19). In
Appendix F we prove the following result. Our findings regarding E-stability are
also contrasted with the literature in the third and forth column of Table 1.
PROPOSITION 5. Assume the monetary policy rule (10). For the empirically
realistic case, conditional on the REE of interest being stationary it holds that:
(I) The monetarist solution is E-stable if
χ+ Θλ2 < (αβ) ∧ χλ1 + Θλ2 < (αβ). (20)
(II) The fiscalist solution is E-stable if
(γ + 1− β−1)χ
(αβ)
< 0 ∧ (21)
(β−1 − γ)χ
(αβ)
+
√
β2[βϕ2 + βϕ1(β−1 − γ)]2[(αβ)2 − 4Θχ]
2αβ2[βϕ2 + βϕ1(β−1 − γ)] >
1
2
∧ (22)
(β−1 − γ)χ
(αβ)
−
√
β2[βϕ2 + βϕ1(β−1 − γ)]2[(αβ)2 − 4Θχ]
2αβ2[βϕ2 + βϕ1(β−1 − γ)] >
1
2
(23)
is true for the real parts of the left-hand side.
(III) None of the non-fundamental solutions is E-stable.
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Note that for χ = 1 conditions (20) to (23) reduce to the ones in Evans and
Honkapohja (2007, p.680). Panels 4a to 4j indicate the E-stability regions for
the monetarist and fiscalist solution respectively. Calibration of ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4 is
discussed in the online appendix. It is worthwhile that the regions cover not
only the determinacy regions from Figure 1, but also show that local divergence
(compare Panels 4h-4j to 1j-1l) is a plausible outcome under LS learning.
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
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(h) (i) (j)
Figure 4: Regions of local E-stability for monetarist solution (light grey), fiscalist solution
(dark grey), and E-instability (remainder) in the empirical relevant α-γ-space, i.e., α ≥ 0,
0 ≤ γ < β−1, for χ ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}, ι ∈ {0.9, 1.0, 1.1}, and β = 0.99. M (F) is the
monetarist (fiscalist) solution.
Backward-looking rule. Define vt ≡ [θt, ψt, ηt]′ and rewrite system (D.1)-(D.2)
to fit (19). In Appendix G we demonstrate that the proposition below holds.
PROPOSITION 6. Assume the monetary policy rule (17). For the empirically
realistic case, given that the fiscalist solution is stationary, it is also E-stable.
This is result may be anticipated, as in this particular case the model appears
to be correctly specified as M = 0.
Forward-looking rule. System (E.1)-(E.2) can be written in the form of (19).
In Appendix H we demonstrate that, due to M = 0, the proposition below holds.
PROPOSITION 7. Assume the monetary policy rule (18). For the empirically
realistic case, given that the fiscalist solution is stationary, it is also E-stable.
The propositions above focus on the case where solutions are stationary. How-
ever, we find it a remarkable result that for all three monetary policy rules, the
fiscalist solution in the AF/PMHE regime appears to be E-stable, even when it
is explosive due to expectational heterogeneity. Thus, the prediction that the
economy under the AF/PMHE eventually diverges from the steady-state due to
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expectational heterogeneity and that this may be a well-defined equilibrium, is
also plausible from an adaptive learning viewpoint. Be aware that under this
regime the fiscalist solution is not necessarily ‘fragile’ (see Evans and Honkapo-
hja, 2007, p.681ff.) in the sense that it is E-stable in the neighbourhood of the
steady-state, but asymptotically loses stability under LS learning. The latter is
known to be the case under AF/AMHE for χ = 1, but whether or not the non-
stationary fiscalist solution under the AF/PMHE is fragile, ultimately needs to
be addressed in a global analysis, which is left for future research.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In sum, this paper puts forth a Neo-Classical theory of fiscal and monetary
policy interaction under heterogeneous expectations. The coexistence of agents
with RE and AE gives rise to economic dynamics strikingly different from the
homogeneous RE benchmark case.
For plausible assumptions on the parameter space, we show that the mone-
tarist solution can be the unique stationary RE solution in a PF/AMHE regime
under a contemporaneous-data interest rate rule. This is true, as the central bank
obeys a generalized Taylor (1993)-principle by incorporating knowledge about the
heterogeneous nature of private sector expectations. To this extent, even active
policy becomes constrained by heterogeneous expectations.
Moreover, we find that an AF/AMHE regime leads to local divergence and
a PF/PMHE regime results in local divergence as well, or opens the door to
arbitrary large economic fluctuations associated with indeterminacy.
Furthermore, the fiscalist solution, where inflation depends on public debt,
can be the unique stationary RE solution, given there is an AF/PMHE regime
in place. Nevertheless, under this regime, ultimately the shares of agents with
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RE and AE become decisive for stationarity. If the share of agents with RE
goes below one half, a value within the empirically relevant range, the fiscalist
solution becomes explosive. This stands in sharp contrast to our findings for
the monetarist solution. More important, the non-stationary fiscalist solution
may be a well-defined equilibrium implying orthodox behavior for macroeconomic
aggregates.
Remarkably, once we consider more implementable interest rate rules, the fis-
calist solution remains the sole possibly stationary solution. The central bank
may still have to incorporate private sector expectations, even when it is pursuing
a passive policy and active fiscal policy is a necessary condition for a determinate
outcome. However, depending on the shares of agents with RE and AE, the fis-
calist solution may become stationary. We also demonstrate that all our findings
are plausible from an adaptive learning viewpoint.
Overall, these results suggest that heterogeneous private sector expectations
constitute a novel challenge to current fiscal and monetary policy arrangements
and their ability to successfully stabilize the economy.
We believe that the concern of persistent expectational heterogeneity and
bounded rationality in general, and with regard to policy interaction in particu-
lar, is of high relevance for academics as well as policy makers. One can view the
present paper as a generalized way of addressing this concern. Clearly, our mod-
eling approach aims at analytical results. It is rather stylized, and might neglect
important aspects. One exemplary issue is to address nominal rigidities and its
implications for policy interaction under heterogeneous expectations. This issue
is left to future research.
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A. MODEL DERIVATIONS
Consider the problem of individual household i. We define W ςt+1(i) ≡ mςt(i) +
bςt(i) and x
ς
t+1(i) = m
ς
t(i). Then the household’s problem can be solved by the
very same Lagrangian as in Evans and Honkapohja (2007), i.e.,
L = Eςt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1− σ1)−1cςt(i)(1−σ1) +A(1− σ2)−1(xςt(i)pi−1t )(1−σ2)
]
−βt+1µ1,t+1
[
W ςt+1(i)− y + ct(i) + τt − xςt(i)pi−1t −Rt−1pi−1t (W ςt (i)− xςt(i))
]
−βt+1µ2,t+1
[
xςt+1(i)−mςt(i)
]}
. (A.1)
This yields the first-order conditions
Eςt {cςt(i)−σ1} − βEςt {µ1,t+1} = 0, (A.2)
Eςt {µ2,t+1} = 0, (A.3)
β−1R−1t−1E
ς
t {µ1,t} = Eςt {µ1,t+1pi−1t }, (A.4)
Eςt {µ2,t} = AEςt {pi−1t (xςt(i)pi−1t )−σ2}+ βEςt {(pi−1t −Rt−1pi−1t )µ1,t+1}, (A.5)
where we make use of Assumption A3 (Branch and McGough, 2009, p.1038).
Re-arranging terms within (A.5), plugging in (A.4), forwarding the resulting ex-
pression, using Assumption A5 and combining it with (A.2)-(A.3) yields
0 = AEςt {piσ2−1t+1 mςt(i)−σ2}+ (R−1t − 1)β−1Eςt {cςt(i)−σ1}. (A.6)
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If every agent can observe his own period t choices of cςt(i) and m
ς
t(i), and within-
type expectations are identical, then in fact individual money demand is
0 = Amςt(i)−σ2Eςt {piσ2−1t+1 }+ (R−1t − 1)β−1cςt(i)−σ1 . (A.7)
We can use the very same assumption together with (A.2) and (A.4) to derive
individual consumption demand
cςt(i)
−σ1 = βRtEςt {cςt+1(i)−σ1pi−1t+1}, (A.8)
where Rt is set by the central bank and states publicly available information.
Clearly, in the non-stochastic steady-state we have R = β−1pi. Next we linearize
(A.8) at the non-stochastic steady-state. Variables are expressed as deviations
from the steady-state, i.e., q˜t ≡ (qt − q) for any variable qt. Thus, we arrive at
c˜ςt(i) = E
ς
t {c˜ςt+1(i)} − σ−11 c
(
R−1R˜t − pi−1Eςt {p˜it+1}
)
. (A.9)
Take into account that all individual agents of the same type will make similar
decisions, i.e., c1t (i) = c
1
t and c
2
t (i) = c
2
t . Therefore we aggregate as follows
ct =
∫ χ
0
c1t (i)di+
∫ 1
χ
c2t (i)di =
∫ χ
0
c1tdi+
∫ 1
χ
c2tdi = χc
1
t + (1− χ)c2t . (A.10)
Next, the agent knows the structure of the economy, so it is natural to assume
that Eςt {c˜ςt+1(i)} = (y − g). Together with (A.10) it follows that
c˜t = (y − g)− σ−11 c
(
R−1R˜t − pi−1Êt{p˜it+1}
)
(A.11)
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Imposing goods market clearing, c˜t = (y − g), and Assumption A1 yields the
Fisher relation
R˜−1t = βÊt{p˜i−1t+1}. (A.12)
Linearization of (A.7) and rearranging terms results in
m˜ςt(i) = σ
−1
2 (σ2 − 1)mpi−1Eςt {p˜i−1t+1} − σ−12 m(R− 1)−1R−1R˜t + σ−12 σ1mc−1c˜ςt(i).
(A.13)
The reasoning for (A.10) above also applies to mςt(i), thus
mt =
∫ χ
0
m1t (i)di+
∫ 1
χ
m2t (i)di =
∫ χ
0
m1tdi+
∫ 1
χ
m2tdi = χm
1
t + (1− χ)m2t .
(A.14)
Aggregating (A.13) by the help of (A.14), imposing the Fisher relation, goods
market clearing as well as the steady-state relationshipm = Cˆ((1−βpi−1)(piσ2−1)−1)−1/σ2 ,
where Cˆ ≡ (Aβ)1/σ2(y−g)σ1/σ2 , leads to the money market equilibrium condition
m˜t =
[(
−Cˆβ
σ2
)
(pi − β)−(1+σ2)/σ2
(
σ2 − 1
σ2
)
Cˆ(pi − β)−1/σ2
]
Êt{p˜it+1}+ const.,
(A.15)
or, following Evans and Honkapohja (2007, p.688) and ignoring the constant, we
can express (A.15) more compact as m˜t = C˜Êt{p˜it+1}.
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B. DETERMINACY CONDITIONS AND LINEAR RESTRICTIONS
By defining yt ≡ [p˜it, b˜t, p˜it−1]′, the system can be rearranged as
yt = Jyt+1 + F1ηt+1 + F2θt+1 + F3θt + F4ψt+1, where (B.1)
J =

0 0 1
0 (β−1 − γ)−1 ((αβ)ϕ1+ϕ2)
(β−1−γ)
− χ
Θ
0 (αβ)
Θ
 (B.2)
is the Jacobian of the system.24 Note that ηt+1 = p˜it+1 − Etp˜it+1 is a martingale
difference sequence as we assume Etηt+1 = 0. We also define Θ ≡ (1− χ)ι2.
System (B.1), given y˘t ≡ [xt, zt, xt−1]′, can be rewritten as
y˘t = Λy˘t+1 + Q
−1 [F1ηt+1 + F2θt+1 + F3θt + F4ψt+1] , (B.3)
where (B.3) follows from diagonalizing matrix J in (B.1). Note that Etp˜it+1 =
p˜it+1 − ηt+1, J = (QΛQ−1) is a decomposition of J into its eigenvalues and its
right eigenvector, and y˘t+1 = Q
−1[p˜it+1, b˜t+1, p˜it]′.
The important matrices in (B.3) are given by
Λ =

λ1 0 0
0 λ2 0
0 0 λ3
 , and (B.4)
24Note that information regarding any matrix not reported herein is irrelevant for the anal-
ysis and omitted for clarity of exposition. More information is available from the author.
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Q−1 =

β(βγ−1)χ(αβϕ1+ϕ2)
(α(βγ−1)+Θ)β2+(βγ−1)2χ 1
β2Θ(αβϕ1+ϕ2)
(α(βγ−1)+Θ)β2+(βγ−1)2χ
χ√
α2β2−4Θχ
0 − Θ√
α2β2−4Θχ
λ2
− χ√
α2β2−4Θχ
0 Θ√
α2β2−4Θχ
λ3
 , (B.5)
where Θ ≡ (1 − χ)ι2. λ1 ≡ (β−1 − γ)−1, λ2 ≡ (αβ)−
√
(αβ)2−4Θχ
2Θ
, and λ3 ≡
(αβ)+
√
(αβ)2−4Θχ
2Θ
are the eigenvalues of J.
Paralleling the analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2007), from (B.3), and
given [C1, C2, C3]
′ = −Q−1F3 we can figure out three different cases. First,
given an AF regime, |(β−1 − γ)−1| < 1, stationarity of the solution requires that
Etxt+1 = λ
−1
1 (xt + C1θt) = 0 to rule out that |Etxt+s| → ∞ as s → ∞. This
yields restriction (i) with coefficients
K1 =
[√
(αβ)2 − 4Θχ(β−1 − γ)(λ1 − λ3)(λ1 − λ2)
χ[(αβ)ϕ1 + ϕ2](λ3 − λ2)
]
,
K2 =
[√
(αβ)2 − 4Θχ(λ1 − λ3)(λ1 − λ2)
χ(λ3 − λ2)
]
×[
β
[(αβ)− λ1Θ− (β−1 − γ)χ] −
(βϕ1 + ϕ4)
[(αβ)ϕ1 + ϕ2]
]
, and K3 =
Θ
χ
λ1.
Moreover, in the PF/AMHE regime, where |(αβ)| > (χ+Θ) is true, stationarity of
the solution requires that Etzt+1 = λ
−1
2 (zt+C2θt) = 0 to rule out that |Etzt+s| →
∞ as s → ∞. Restriction (ii) follows with coefficients K1 = 0, K2 = −χ−1βλ2,
and K3 = χ
−1Θλ2. Finally, in the PF/PMHE regime, where |(αβ)| < (χ+ Θ) is
true, stationarity of the solution requires that xt = λ
−1
3 (xt−1 + C3θt) = 0 to rule
out that |xt+s| → ∞ as s → ∞. This leads to restriction (iii) with coefficients
K1 = 0, K2 = −χ−1βλ3, and K3 = χ−1Θλ3.
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C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. We consider the empirical relevant parameter space to be α > 0, β > 0,
and χ ∈ (0, 1]. Following the arguments in Evans and Honkapohja (2007, p.681),
we assume β−1 > γ ≥ 0. The characteristic polynomial of J is given by
P(ψ) = −ψ3 + [(β−1 − γ)−1 + Θ−1(αβ)]ψ2
− [Θ−1((αβ)(β−1 − γ)−1 + χ)]ψ + Θ−1χ(β−1 − γ)−1, (C.1)
where it’s roots coincide with the eigenvalues λ1, λ2, and λ3. The assumptions
on γ above imply that there is at least one real root, λ1.
Moreover, Descartes’ rule of signs suggests that there is a maximum of three
positive real roots and zero negative real roots. Furthermore note that P(−∞)→
+∞, P(−1) > 0, P(0) > 0, and P(∞)→ −∞.
Next, with regard to λ2 and λ3, if (αβ) > (χ+ Θ), then P(1) < 0, and either
there is one real root or a pair of complex conjugates with the same modulus
inside the unit circle. In case of (αβ) < (χ + Θ), then P(1) > 0, and there is
no real root inside the unit circle. However, λ2 and λ3 may also form a pair of
complex conjugates. In this case their identical modulus can be inside or outside
the unit circle. In order to analyze the various possible cases, it is useful to
calculate the discriminant of P(ψ), which is given by
D = (α
2β2 − 4Θχ) [β2(α(βγ − 1) + Θ) + χ(βγ − 1)2]2
Θ4(βγ − 1)4 . (C.2)
According to Irving (2004, p.154), three cases are possible. First, if D > 0, then
P(ψ) has three distinct real roots. Second, if D < 0, then P(ψ) has one real root
and a pair of complex conjugates with identical modulus. We ignore the third
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case, where D = 0 and P(ψ) has multiple real roots. One can verify that the sign
of D depends on whether (αβ) is larger or smaller than √4χΘ. Furthermore,
note that (χ+ Θ) ≥ √4χΘ.
Now, in case of PF, i.e., γ > β−1 − 1, the root λ1 is real and outside the
unit circle. Likewise root λ1 is real and inside the unit circle in case of AF,
i.e., γ < β−1 − 1. Consequently, in a PF/AMHE regime it follows that (αβ) >
(χ + Θ) ≥ √4χΘ and there are three distinct real roots, |λ1| > 1, |λ2| < 1,
and |λ3| > 1, which yield local determinacy. In contrast, under an AF/AMHE
regime there is local divergence from the steady-state as this policy regime yields
|λ1| < 1, |λ2| < 1, and |λ3| > 1.
Next, given a PF/PMHE regime, it is true that, when (χ + Θ) > (αβ) >
√
4χΘ, there are three distinct real roots, |λ1| > 1, |λ2| > 1, and |λ3| > 1 and this
results in local indeterminacy. In case of (χ+ Θ) ≥ √4χΘ > (αβ) there is a pair
of complex conjugates, λ2 and λ3, with identical modulus. If λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) < 1,
then their identical modulus is inside the unit circle. If λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) > 1, then
it is outside the unit circle.
In sum, when (χ+ Θ) ≥ √4χΘ > (αβ) is true, a PF/PMHE regime leads to
local indeterminacy if (χ/Θ) > 1, as |λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3| > 1. And, if (χ/Θ) < 1 there
is local divergence from the steady-state as |λ1| > 1, and |λ2|, |λ3| < 1.
Finally, for the AF/PMHE regime similar arguments apply. In case of (χ +
Θ) > (αβ) >
√
4χΘ, there are three distinct real roots, |λ1| < 1, and |λ2|, |λ3| > 1
and local determinacy prevails. However, when (χ+ Θ) ≥ √4χΘ > (αβ) is true,
an AF/PMHE regime does only yield local determinacy if λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) > 1,
but results in local divergence if λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) < 1
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D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. Following the approach outlined in Subsection 3.1 above, the economy
given by a linearized version of (6)-(7), including the policy block (8)-(9), and
(17) as well as the expectational set-up (3) to (5) can be expressed by
p˜it = χ
−1 [(αβ)− (1− χ)ι2] p˜it−2 − χ−1βθt + ηt (D.1)
0 = b˜t+1 + φ1χEtp˜it+1 + [φ1(1− χ)ι2 + φ5]p˜it−1 + φ2p˜it
− (β−1 − γ)b˜t + ψt+1 + φ3θt+1 + φ4θt, (D.2)
and the coefficients φ1 = [mpi
−2+Rbpi−2], φ2 = [C˜βα], φ3 = C˜β, φ4 = [−pi−1C˜β−
pi−1b], φ5 = [−pi−1C˜βα− pi−1bα].
For yt ≡ [p˜it, b˜t, p˜it−1, p˜it−2]′, this yields the following Jacobian
JBW =

0 0 1 0
χφ1
(β−1−γ) (β
−1 − γ)−1 φ2
(β−1−γ)
(Θφ1+φ5)
(β−1−γ)
0 0 0 1
0 0 χ
(αβ)−Θ 0

. (D.3)
Next, a similar decomposition as in Appendix B above, JBW = (QBWΛBWQ
−1
BW ),
yields ΛBW = diag(λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3), where the eigenvalues of JBW are now given
by λ0 ≡ 0, λ1 ≡ (β−1 − γ)−1, λ2 ≡ −
√
χ√
(αβ)−Θ , and λ3 ≡
√
χ√
(αβ)−Θ .
Next, consider the characteristic polynomial of JBW given by
PBW (ψ) = ψ4 − (β−1 − γ)−1ψ3 − χ
[(αβ)−Θ]ψ
2 +
χ
(β−1 − γ)[(αβ)−Θ]ψ,
(D.4)
where it’s roots coincide with the eigenvalues λ0, λ1, λ2, and λ3. λ0 is a real root,
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and, due to the assumptions from above, λ1 is so too.
Moreover, Descartes’ rule of signs suggests that there is a maximum of three
positive real roots and one (zero) negative real root if (αβ) > (<)Θ.
The discriminant of PBW (ψ), can be computed as
DBW = 4χ
3 [β3(Θ− (αβ)) + β(βγ −Θ)2χ]2
(βγ − 1)6((αβ)−Θ)5 . (D.5)
If χ = 0, then DBW = 0, and three of the four roots of PBW (ψ) are equal to zero.
Moreover, with assumptions β 6= 0 and χ ∈ (0, 1], we can rule out DBW = 0.
Next, as discussed in Irving (2004, p.167), if DBW > 0, then PBW (ψ) has four
distinct real roots. In contrast, for DBW < 0, PBW (ψ) has two distinct real roots
and a pair of complex conjugates. It can be shown that DBW > 0 if (αβ) > Θ,
and that DBW < 0 if (αβ) < Θ.
In case of the PF/AMHE regime, (αβ) > (χ+ Θ) ≥ Θ there are four distinct
real roots, |λ0| < 1 |λ1| > 1, |λ2| < 1, and |λ3| < 1, which implies local divergence.
Next, it is straightforward that the AF/AMHE regime, has similar implica-
tions as there are four distinct real roots, |λ0|, |λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3| < 1.
For the PF/PMHE regime, one can verify that, if (χ+ Θ) > (αβ) > Θ, there
exist four distinct real roots |λ0| < 1, and |λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3| > 1, which renders the
economy locally indeterminate. When (χ+ Θ) ≥ Θ > (αβ), the roots λ2 and λ3
form a pair of complex conjugates with identical modulus λ2λ3 = χ/[Θ− (αβ)].
It follows that if (αβ) > (Θ − χ), then λ2λ3 > 1, and if (αβ) < (Θ − χ), then
λ2λ3 < 1. Thus, when (χ + Θ) > (αβ) > Θ, the PF/PMHE regime yields local
indeterminacy if (αβ) > (Θ− χ), as |λ0| < 1 and |λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3| > 1. However, if
(αβ) < (Θ−χ), then |λ0|, |λ2|, |λ3| < 1 and |λ1| > 1 and there is local divergence.
For the AF/PMHE regime an equivalent reasoning can be used. For (χ+Θ) >
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(αβ) > Θ there are four distinct real roots and it follows that |λ0|, |λ1| < 1 and
|λ2|, |λ3| > 1, which yields local determinacy. The same is true if (χ+ Θ) ≥ Θ >
(αβ) and at the same time (αβ) > (Θ− χ). But once (αβ) < (Θ− χ) the result
is |λ0|, |λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3| < 1, which implies local divergence.
E. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. Following the approach outlined in Appendix D while utilizing rule (18)
we can derive the following dynamical system
p˜it = −χ−1(1− χ)ι2p˜it−2 + χ−1 β
[1− (αβ)]θt−1 + ηt (E.1)
0 = b˜t+1 + χ[φ1 + φ7]Etp˜it+1 + (1− χ)ι2[φ1 + φ5]p˜it−1 + (1− χ)ι2φ2p˜it
− (β−1 − γ)b˜t + χφ6Etp˜it+2 + ψt+1 + φ3θt+1 + φ4θt, (E.2)
with coefficients φ1 = [mpi
−2 + Rbpi−2], φ2 = [C˜βα], φ3 = C˜β, φ4 = [−pi−1C˜β −
pi−1b], φ5 = [−pi−1C˜βα− pi−1bα], φ6 = φ2, φ7 = φ5.
This yields the following Jacobian
JFW =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
χφ6
(β−1−γ)
χ(φ1+φ7)
(β−1−γ) (β
−1 − γ)−1 φ2
(β−1−γ)
Θ(φ1+φ5)
(β−1−γ)
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 χ
(αβ)−Θ 0

, (E.3)
where yt ≡ [p˜it+1, p˜it, b˜t, p˜it−1, p˜it−2]′. Again, a similar decomposition as in Ap-
pendix B above, JFW = (QFWΛFWQ
−1
FW ), yields ΛFW = diag(λ0, λ00, λ1, λ2, λ3),
where the eigenvalues of JFW are now given by λ00 = λ0 ≡ 0, λ1 ≡ (β−1 − γ)−1,
λ2 ≡ − i
√
χ√
Θ
, and λ3 ≡ i
√
χ√
Θ
.
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Next, consider the characteristic polynomial of JFW is given by
PFW (ψ) = −ψ5 + (β−1 − γ)−1ψ4 − χ
Θ
ψ3 +
χ
Θ
(β−1 − γ)−1ψ2, (E.4)
where it’s roots coincide with the eigenvalues λ00, λ0, λ1, λ2, and λ3. λ00 and λ0
are real roots, and, due to the assumptions from above, λ1 is so too. Clearly λ2
and λ3 are a pair of complex conjugates with identical modulus λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ).
If λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) < 1, then their identical modulus is inside the unit circle. If
λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) > 1, then it is outside the unit circle.
Descartes’ rule of signs implies that there is a maximum of three positive real
roots and zero negative real roots. Next, the discriminant of PFW (ψ), can be
computed as DFW = 0, which confirms the multiplicity, see Irving (2004, p.173).
Now, inspection of the eigenvalues makes clear that monetary policy does
not affect the eigenvalues. In addition, under the PF regime, there are three
distinct real roots, |λ00|, |λ0| < 1, and |λ1| > 1. For sufficiently large χ, local
indeterminacy follows as λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) > 1, otherwise there is local divergence.
In contrast, the AF regime generates three distinct real roots, |λ00|, |λ0|, |λ1| <
1, and |λ1| > 1, and, for sufficiently large χ, local determinacy, as λ2λ3 = (χ/Θ) >
1. Otherwise there is local divergence from the steady-state.
F. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. As shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2007, p.689ff.), the E-stability con-
ditions are given by
DATA(A¯, B¯) = M(I + B¯), (F.1)
DBTB(B¯) = B¯
′ ⊗M + (I ⊗MB¯), (F.2)
48
DCTC(B¯, C¯, D¯) = (I ⊗MB¯), (F.3)
DDTD(B¯, D¯) = (I ⊗MB¯), (F.4)
where A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯ characterize the REE of interest. For a REE to be locally stable
under LS learning, the real parts of all eigenvalues of matrices (F.1) to (F.4) have
to be less than one.
We will restrict attention to the empirical realistic parameter space for the
various stationary solutions from Proposition 1. Note that we rather sketch the
proof and will not report matrices (F.1) to (F.4) for the individual cases due to
space constraints. Mathematica routines for the details are available.
1. For the monetarist solution (III) from Proposition 1 the non-zero eigen-
values of matrices (F.1) to (F.4) are given by { χ
(αβ)
+ Θλ2
(αβ)
, Θλ2
(αβ)
, 2Θλ2
(αβ)
,
χλ−11
(αβ)
+
Θλ2
(αβ)
}. For AMHE it holds that (αβ) > (χ+ Θ) ≥ √4Θχ and therefore the
solution is E-stable if the reported conditions are satisfied.
2. The continuum of non-fundamental solutions (V I) is not E-stable, as the
non-zero eigenvalues of DCTC and DDTD are equal to unity. Alternatively,
it can be shown that the real part of at least one eigenvalue of DBTB is
larger or equal to 3/2.
3. For the fiscalist solution (I) the non-zero eigenvalues of matrices (F.1)
to (F.4) are given by {1 − (β−1−1−γ)χ
(αβ)
, 1 − (β−1−γ)χ
(αβ)
}, and {3
2
− (β−1−γ)χ
(αβ)
−√
β2[βϕ2+βϕ1(β−1−γ)]2[(αβ)2−4Θχ]
2αβ2[βϕ2+βϕ1(β−1−γ)] ,
3
2
− (β−1−γ)χ
(αβ)
+
√
β2[βϕ2+βϕ1(β−1−γ)]2[(αβ)2−4Θχ]
2αβ2[βϕ2+βϕ1(β−1−γ)] }.
Thus, the solution can only be E-stable for the conditions given.
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G. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof. For the empirical realistic parameter space and monetary policy rule (17)
it can be verified that for the fiscalist solution in Proposition 3, characterized
by M = 0, B = {{0, 0, 0}, {−ϕ2, (β−1 − γ),−αβϕ1−Θϕ1+ϕ5χχ }, {1, 0, 0}}, and some
matrices A¯, C¯, D¯, the eigenvalues of matrices (F.1) to (F.4) are all zero.
H. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof. Under monetary policy rule (18) one can show for the empirical real-
istic parameter space that the fiscalist solution from Proposition 4, character-
ized by M = {{0, 0, 0}, {χϕ6, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}}, B = {{0, 0,−χ−1Θ}, {0, (β−1 −
γ),Θ (χ−1ϕ1 − ϕ5 + ϕ7)}, {0, 0, 0}}, and some matrices A¯, C¯, D¯, yields eigenval-
ues of matrices (F.1) to (F.4) all equal to zero.
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